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NOTE
LIABILITIES OF THE INNOCENT CURRENT OWNER OF TOXIC
PROPERTY UNDER CERCLA
I. INTRODUCTION
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act of 1980' ("CERCLA") was enacted to facilitate prompt cleanup
of property contaminated by hazardous wastes.2 CERCLA seeks to ac-
complish its goal in part by placing the financial burden of cleanup on
those parties who are responsible for the problem and who benefited from
the hazardous waste activity.3 Because environmental cleanup is a na-
tional priority and the cost of cleaning up toxic waste sites is staggering,
the scope of liability under CERCLA is broad.4 A clean environment is a
laudable goal and compelling responsible parties to bear the cost of
cleanup is fair, but in its zeal to divert cleanup costs to private parties,
Congress created strict liability for innocent current owners.5
CERCLA was hastily enacted by a lame-duck Congress after many last
minute compromises and changes. Consequently, many of CERCLA's
provisions are vague and cannot be explained by its contradictory legisla-
tive history.' As a result, courts have struggled to interpret CERCLA's
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1982), amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (Supp. IV 1986).
2. Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1288 (D. Del. 1987),
aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988).
3. Id. at 1276.
4. See, e.g., Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HAnv. L. REv., 1458,
1484-85 (1986) [hereinafter Developments].
5. For purposes of this Note, the "innocent current owner" is one who did not partici-
pate in hazardous waste activities and who acquired property contaminated by hazardous
substances without actual knowledge of the contamination.
6. E.g., Artesian, 659 F. Supp. at 1277 n.7 (Committee reports and other materials are of
relatively little value because CERCLA as enacted reflects "legislative judgments that dif-
fered substantially from those incorporated in the earlier House and Senate bills."); United
States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985) (CERCLA is notorious for its
"vaguely-drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory legislative history.");
United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983) (CERCLA's "legislative his-
tory must be read with caution since last minute changes in the bill were inserted with little
or no explanation.").
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provisions consistently with its broad purposes. In particular, courts and
commentators disagree whether the imposition of strict liability on
nonculpable parties, such as the innocent current owner, is consistent
with CERCLA's policy of making those who benefited economically from
hazardous waste activities pay for the harm they caused. Case law is in
agreement on many basic issues. However, issues relating to joint and sev-
eral liability, the right of contribution, and the breadth of a statutory
third-party or "innocent land owner" defense remain unanswered.
The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986'
("SARA") resolves some of the ambiguities and provides new guidance on
how a purchaser of toxic property may protect himself from liability by
creating statutory "innocence." Other provisions of SARA mitigate the
harshness of imposing strict liability on nonculpable parties by more eq-
uitably distributing liability among responsible parties. Nonetheless, the
protection afforded an innocent current owner may be illusory at best. As
a practical matter, statutory innocence may be unattainable for most pur-
chasers' and, in absence of that defense, the innocent current owner may
buckle under staggering liability created by parties who can no longer be
held accountable for the harm they caused.
After'giving a brief overview of CERCLA, this Note examines the scope
of an innocent current owner's liability under CERCLA prior to the en-
actment of SARA in 1986. This Note then focuses on how SARA affects
the scope of liability and provides the courts with flexibility in fashioning
uniform federal rules which will lessen the harshness of the innocent cur-
rent owner's liability. In particular, this Note recommends judicial cau-
tion in developing blanket rules for the imposition of joint and several
liability and careful development of equitable factors consistent with
CERCLA's underlying policies in fashioning methods for the apportion-
ment of response costs among potentially responsible parties.
II. OVERVIEW OF CERCLA
CERCLA was hastily enacted on December 11, 1980, in the waning
hours of President Carter's administration, partially in response to the
Love Canal environmental disaster.10 Its enactment was intended to sup-
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (Supp. IV 1986).
8. One commentator has characterized the statutory affirmative defenses as ineffective at
best and "at worst a cruel congressional joke." Dubuc & Evans, Recent Developments
Under CERCLA: Toward a More Equitable Distribution of Liability, 17 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10197, 10197 (June 1987).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1982), amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (Supp. IV 1986).
10. Note, Hazardous Waste and the Innocent Purchaser, 38 U. FLA. L. REV., 253, 254-55
(1986). Environmental hazards at Love Canal surfaced in the 1970s, approximately twenty
years after more than 21,000 tons of hazardous waste had been deposited in an area later
developed for residential purposes. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 680 F.
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plement the Resource Conservation Recovery Act of 1976" ("RCRA"),
which regulated newly-created hazardous waste from "cradle-to-grave,"
but failed to reach abandoned and inactive hazardous waste sites already
in existence. 2 CERCLA has two major purposes: to create a source of
funds, commonly known as "Superfund,"" s for financing prompt govern-
mental cleanup of hazardous waste sites, and to force responsible parties
to bear the cost of cleaning up the hazards they create.14
CERCLA creates liability for four classes of potentially responsible par-
ties: (1) current owners and operators of facilities; (2) owners and opera-
tors of facilities at the time of disposal; (3) generators who disposed of
hazardous waste at the facility; and (4) transporters of hazardous waste to
the facility.15 Responsible parties are liable for the costs'" of cleaning up
Supp. 546, 549 (W.D.N.Y. 1988). The health threat to residents was so great that nearly
1,000 families were moved at government expense and their homes destroyed or boarded up.
Richmond Times-Dispatch, Sept. 28, 1988, at A-16, col. 1. Ten years after the problem was
discovered, cleanup has progressed to the point that part of the area can be resettled, but
other portions are still not habitable. Id.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1982), amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (Supp. II 1984).
12. Note, supra note 10, at 254-55; see also Note, Federal and State Remedies to Clean
up Hazardous Waste Sites, 20 U. RiCH. L. REv., 379, 381 n.10 (1986). RCRA regulates the
generation, transportation, treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste by means of
a manifest tracking and permitting system, coupled with inspection and monitoring require-
ments. Id. at 390. Prior to CERCLA, courts had determined that RCRA did not apply to
inactive and abandoned hazardous waste sites. Id. at 391.
13. "Superfund" is the common name for the "Hazardous Substance Response Trust
Fund." Note, supra note 10, at 256. The fund is financed primarily by an excise tax on
petroleum and other related chemicals and is supplemented by general revenues. Exxon
Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 359 (1986); Note, supra note 12, at 381 n.13. Monies from the
fund may be used to finance "governmental response" costs and to pay expressly authorized
"claims" to other persons. Hunt, 475 U.S. at 360.
14. Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1288 (D.R.I. 1986); United States v. Reilly Tar &
Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982); see also Philadelphia v. Stepan
Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Secondary goals of CERCLA have
also been suggested. E.g., Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus.
Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (CERCLA's objectives include the encour-
agement of care and responsibility in handling hazardous waste, the encouragement of vol-
untary cleanups, and the encouragement of early reporting on violations of the statute.);
United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1114 (D.N.J. 1983) (Cost-spreading was one of
CERCLA's legislative aims.).
15. Section 9607(a) defines the four classes of responsible parties as:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel [otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States] or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or en-
tity, at any facility owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
1989]
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hazardous waste facilities 17 when there is a release or threatened release
of hazardous substances."8 Actions seeking recovery from an innocent cur-
rent owner can be initiated in a variety of ways. CERCLA empowers the
Environmental Protection Agency 9 ("EPA") to undertake necessary
cleanup itself with Superfund monies and then to seek reimbursement
from the current owner or other responsible parties." Alternatively, the
government may compel a current owner to perform cleanup at its own
expense when there is an "imminent and substantial" danger to health or
environment "because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous
substance from a facility."'" Additionally, CERCLA permits a private
cause of action against the current owner by any person who has incurred
costs resulting from a release or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stance from the property. 22
Liability under CERCLA is strict23 and is subject only to very limited
affirmative defenses. 24 Once a responsible party is found liable, CERCLA
permits imposition of joint and several liability25 for a broad array of
cleanup costs26 without express provisions for a right of contribution from
other responsible parties.'
7
disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by such person, from which there is a
release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
The portion of subparagraph (4) which reads "from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substances"
modifies subparagraphs (1)-(3) as well. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043
n.16 (2d Cir. 1985).
16. See infra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
19. CERCLA actually grants express authority to the President. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)
(Supp. IV 1986). However, the President delegated most of the authority to the EPA. See
Exec. Order No. 12,316, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,237 (1981); Exec. Order No. 12,286, 46 Fed. Reg.
9901 (1981).
20. Superfund monies may be used for governmental and private party response costs if
the owner or other responsible parties will not undertake proper cleanup action. 42 U.S.C. §
9611(a) (Supp. IV 1986). Additionally, the government is authorized to undertake response
costs and recover from responsible parties. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a)-(b).
21. Id. § 9606(a).
22. Id. 9 9607(a)(4)(B).
23. See infra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 90-105 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 106-25 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 76-89 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
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III. SCOPE OF CURRENT OWNER LIABILTY
A. Inclusion of the Current Owner as a Responsible Party
"CERCLA ' 2' defines liability in terms of the status of parties in rela-
tionship to hazardous facilities and the costs for which they are responsi-
ble."9 Responsible parties include "the owner and operator" 30 of a hazard-
ous waste facility. 1 In turn, an "owner or operator" is defined as "any
person owning or operating [a] facility. 32 Defendants have been unsuc-
cessful in arguing that the conjunctive use of "owner and operator" re-
quires that a current owner also be an operator to come within the classi-
fication of section 9607(a)(1).3 3 Similarly, arguments that Congress did
not intend to unfairly impose liability on innocent parties have fallen
upon the deaf ears of courts.
The leading case holding a current owner strictly liable on the basis of
current ownership alone is New York v. Shore Realty Corp.34 In Shore,
the state brought an action under CERCLA to compel Shore to clean up
a hazardous waste disposal site it had purchased for land development
and to reimburse the state for cleanup costs already incurred.35 Shore
maintained that Congress intended that only those parties who owned the
facility at the time of disposal or who caused the presence or release of a
hazardous substance be held liable for cleanup costs. 6 In holding that
section 9607(a)(1) imposes strict liability on all current owners, the court
distinguished liability under section 9607(a)(2), which includes prior own-
ers as responsible parties only if they owned the facility "at the time of
disposal of any hazardous substances. '37 The court reasoned that exclud-
ing current owners from the list of responsible parties would create a
loophole in CERCLA's coverage allowing waste sites to be sold to new
owners after disposal of hazardous waste had ceased and by allowing the
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1982), amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (Supp. IV 1986).
29. Id. § 9607.
30. Id. § 9607(a)(1).
31. See infra note 55.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
33. Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1280-81 (D. Del. 1987),
aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F.
Supp. 573, 578 (D. Md. 1986).
34. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
35. Id. at 1037.
36. Id. at 1043-44.
37. Id. at 1044; accord Artesian, 659 F. Supp. at 1280. Since the Shore decision, Con-
gress has provided that some prior owners may be responsible parties absent the disposal of
hazardous substances during their ownership. Under the 1986 amendments, a prior owner
who "obtained actual knowledge of the release or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stance" while he owned the property and then transferred the property without disclosing
his knowledge, is treated as a current owner and is barred from using any of the statutory
defenses to strict liability. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C) (Supp. IV 1986).
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new owner to avoid any liability for cleanup.38 Such a result would frus-
trate CERCLA's goals, because Congress was conscious of the fact that
persons who create the hazard sometimes cannot be found or are other-
wise unavailable as a source of funds.3 9
The result in Shore was alarming but not particularly harsh in light of
the circumstances surrounding Shore's ownership of the property. Shore
knew when it purchased the property that hazardous wastes had been
deposited there and that expensive cleanup would be necessary before
construction of its planned condominium development.40 Additionally,
with Shore's knowledge, an unauthorized hold-over tenant continued to
operate a waste facility and to accept additional chemical wastes after
ownership had passed to Shore.41
In the aftermath of Shore, the concern exists that liability based on
mere ownership is unfair to parties who unwittingly and without fault
find themselves responsible, at enormous costs, for cleaning up the con-
tamination created by others. Relatively few cases actually involve cur-
rent owners who did not know they were purchasing contaminated prop-
erty or who did not in some way contribute to the contamination.
However, the results in those cases where the owner was seemingly with-
out knowledge of what he was purchasing and without fault in creation of
the hazard demonstrate the far-reaching effects of liability based on mere
ownership.42
38. Shore, 759 F.2d at 1045.
39. Id. It is not clear what congressional goal the court thought would be frustrated if it
failed to impose liability on all current owners, unless it was the goal of compelling any
nongovernmental party connected to the property to bear the cost of cleanup rather than
burdening the public with the costs.
40. Id. at 1037-38.
41. Id. at 1038-39, 1045. However, the court did not find it necessary to rely upon the
continuing contamination after title passed to Shore for a finding of liability. See id. at
1045.
42. E.g., NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 897 (9th Cir. 1986) (limited partner-
ship forced into bankruptcy when it was required "to expend approximately $1,200,000"
after learning that land it had purchased for condominium project was contaminated); T &
E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696, 698-99 (D.N.J. 1988) (current owner
required to clean up site it purchased without knowledge of radium tailings left by a com-
pany that had ceased manufacturing 48 years earlier, even though it did not learn of hazard
until five years after purchase and 10 years after first leasing the property); Jersey City
Redevelopment Auth. v. PPG Indus., 655 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (D.N.J. 1987) (current owner
required to comply with cleanup order when its excavation contractor used contaminated fill
material); Interchange Office Park v. Standard Indus., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 166, 167 (W.D.
Tex. 1987) (current owner required to expend $2,000,000 to clean up property acquired for
commercial, office and residential development when four years after purchase it was noti-
fied by state of lead contamination); D'Imperio v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 248, 250
(D.N.J. 1983) (current owner not aware of hazardous materials until 11 years after he had
purchased the site); Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1139 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (current owner of municipal landfill liable for estimated $10 million cleanup costs
when employees accepted bribes and permitted disposal of hazardous wastes).
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Part of the harshness stems from an expansive interpretation of owner-
ship. In addition to ownership based solely upon being the record title
holder of the property, courts have applied a control test to find that a
party who does not hold record title to the property may nonetheless be
an owner if he has control over the property and is responsible for the
hazardous conditions. 3
Congress did carve out of its definition of "owner or operator" a small
exception for a person who "without participating in the management
holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security inter-
est. 44 But even this exception was given narrow interpretation in United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.4" Maryland Bank & Trust acquired
title to contaminated property when it purchased the property at its own
foreclosure sale.46 Over one year later, the bank learned that the property
contained hazardous waste.41 When the bank refused to clean up the
property, the EPA did the cleanup and sought to recover over $500,000 in
costs. 4 18 The court rejected the bank's argument that it was exempt from
liability under section 9601(20)(A) because it acquired ownership through
foreclosure on its security interest.49 The court held that the exemption
applied only to those parties who "hold indicia of ownership to protect a
then-held security interest" at the time of cleanup and not mortgagees
who had subsequently acquired full title through foreclosure50 Since the
bank's security interest was converted to full ownership by the foreclo-
sure sale, its continued interest in the property was to protect its invest-
43. E.g., Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 671-72 (D. Idaho 1986) (parent
corporation is "owner or operator" where familiar with activities at subsidiary's facility and
able to control activities there); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc.,
653 F. Supp. 984, 1003 (D.S.C. 1984) (A lessee is treated as an owner when he has control
over the property and is responsible for the hazardous conditions and the fact that he sub-
lets a portion of the property strengthens the finding of ownership through control.), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, sub nom. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir.
1988); United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 ENvrrL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,698 (D.S.C. June
15, 1984) (Owner liability might extend to a company that held title for only one hour while
acting as a conduit for transfer from a trustee in bankruptcy to company officials, depending
upon the amount of control the company retained after transfer.); cf. United States v. Dart
Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 144, 146 (4th Cir. 1988) (State environmental agency's actions in in-
specting site, approving applications to store waste, and requiring proper transportation of
wastes to the facility were not sufficient to support a finding of ownership by control of
activities where there was no direct "hands on" management of employees or finances.).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (iii).
45. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
46. Id. at 575.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 575-76.
49. Id. at 578-79.
50. Id. at 579. The court relied upon legislative history suggesting that Congress in-
tended the exemption to apply only where the mortgagee is the actual title holder by opera-
tion of common law and not where the mortgagee has acquired full title. Id. at 579-80.
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ment, not its security interest."
The court maintained that its narrow construction of the security inter-
est exemption was consistent with CERCLA's underlying policy. To hold
otherwise would allow a mortgagee to acquire property cheaply by fore-
closure and reap the benefit of increased value in land cleaned up at gov-
ernment expense while other prospective purchasers would not be enti-
tled to the same advantage.5 2 Rather than broadening the security
interest exemption, the court preferred to place responsibilities on lend-
ing institutions "to investigate and discover potential problems in their
secured properties. '" 5' The holding is consistent with the requirements for
the innocent landowner defense because of its similar requirement of in-
spection and investigation
4
.
5
51. Id. at 579. In dicta, the court suggested that its holding might be limited to similar
situations where the former mortgagee-turned-owner had held title for a number of years,
some of which were prior to cleanup. Id. In doing so, the court declined to expressly disagree
with United States v. Mirabile, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4,
1985), which had applied the exemption to a former mortgagee who held the property for
only four months. Id. at 580 n.5. It should be noted, however, that the mortgagee in
Mirabile was not the current owner and held only a security interest in the property at the
time hazardous substances were disposed of there. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,995.
Section 9607(a)(2) includes a prior owner as a responsible party only if there was disposal of
hazardous waste during the tenure of ownership. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d
1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985). For a thorough discussion of lender liability under CERCLA as
exemplified in the Maryland Bank & Trust and Mirabile decisions see Note, When a Secur-
ity Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 1261 (1987).
52. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 580. The court noted, however, that liabil-
ity could have been avoided had the bank not foreclosed or not bid at the foreclosure sale.
Id. at 580 n.6. The question which has not been addressed directly by courts or commenta-
tors is whether a lender can avoid liability by electing not to foreclose until after other
parties have borne the cleanup costs. This option seems implicit in the 1986 amendments
authorizing an automatic federal lien on properties cleaned up with Superfund monies be-
cause the lien is made explicitly subordinate to the rights of a secured creditor who per-
fected its interest before actual notice of the lien was received or before notice of the lien
was filed. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(l)-(m) (Supp. IV 1986). If Congress had intended to discourage
secured parties from delaying foreclosure to avoid liability, it could have granted priority
status to the federal lien.
53. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 580. For a discussion of the potential con-
flict between the requirement that lenders monitor their secured properties and the limita-
tion of the security interest exemption to those lenders who do not participate in the man-
agement of the property, see Note, supra note 51, at 1295. Lenders can also reallocate risks
by requiring borrowers to clean up environmental problems and comply with environmental
laws and by obtaining warranties and guarantees from the borrower. Climate for Real Es-
tate Lawyers "Gloomy" Due to Environmental Liability, ABA Told, 18 ENV'T REP. (BNA)
1106 (Aug. 21, 1987) [hereinafter Climate Gloomy].
54. See infra notes 148-59 and accompanying text. The holding is also supported by
SARA's amended definition of "owner or operator," which excludes governmental units ac-
quiring ownership through foreclosure but does not make the same provision for private
mortgagees. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (Supp. IV 1986).
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Additional harshness results from the broad definition of "facility" as
virtually any place where hazardous wastes are found.5 Although a "con-
sumer product in consumer use" is not a facility under section 9601(9),
the exception has not been tested in the courts. This leaves open the pos-
sibility that a current homeowner may be liable for cleanup and contain-
ment costs if there is a release or threatened release of hazardous sub-
stances from his property.
Just such a result occurred in Tanglewood East Homeowners v.
Charles-Thomas, Inc.."' In Tanglewood, owners of lots in a subdivision
built on property operated as a wood-treatment facility brought suit
under CERCLA against a lending institution, developers, construction
companies, and real estate agents and agencies participating in the devel-
opment.57 Prior to bringing suit, the homeowners incurred relocation and
investigatory costs and expended monies for building dikes and trenches
to contain the release of hazardous substances.58 Because Tanglewood has
not yet been heard on the merits, 9 it is unknown to what extent the
homeowners will prevail on recovery of costs or whether the court will
specifically address the consumer exception.
B. Imposition of Strict Liability
CERCLA imposes strict liability on responsible parties whenever there
is a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility
and costs are incurred in responding to the harm.0 CERLCA does not,
however, expressly provide that responsible parties be held strictly lia-
ble.61 Yet, without exception, courts have found clear congressional intent
55. United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 895 (E.D.N.C. 1985); see also United States
v. Metate Asbestos Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1143, 1148 (D. Ariz. 1984) (asbestos fibers on the
ground enough to qualify subdivision as a facility).
Section 9601(9) defines "facility" as:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including
any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon,
impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or air-
craft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited,
stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not include
any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
56. 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988).
57. Id. at 1571.
58. Id. at 1575. The hazardous conditions, which will require future costs for the demoli-
tion of six homes, the construction of bunkers to contain the hazardous materials, and mil-
lions of dollars in cleanup, was not discovered until eight years after developers had ac-
quired the property and constructed numerous homes. Id. at 1571.
59. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit heard the case only as an interlocutory
appeal of the trial court's refusal to grant the defendants' motions to dismiss. Id. at 1571-72.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982).
61. Section 9601(32) provides only that "liability. . . shall be construed to be the stan-
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to impose strict liability from CERCLA's legislative history and its incor-
poration by reference of the liability standard of the Clean Water Act. 2
In applying a strict liability standard in New York v. Shore Realty
Corp.,3 the court refused to read a causation requirement into the impo-
sition of strict liability on current owners.6 ' The court reasoned that re-
quiring a showing that the potentially responsible party had caused the
harm would render the statutory defenses meaningless because the de-
fenses serve as a substitute for a causation requirement by excepting oth-
erwise responsible parties from liability on the basis of causation. In
short, the conduct of a party is not examined once it is determined that
he meets the criteria of being a responsible party.6
While it is not necessary when imposing strict liability to show that the
cause of the harm was a responsible party's culpable conduct, it is neces-
sary to show a causal connection between the release or threatened re-
lease and the incurrence of response costs. 7 However, release" and the
threat of release have been given liberal interpretations, 69 and courts are
dard of liability" under 33 U.S.C. § 1321, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (The
Clean Water Act). Id. § 9601(32).
62. The finding of clear congressional intent is based upon the assumption that at the
time of CERCLA's enactment, Congress knew the courts had interpreted the Clean Water
Act as imposing strict liability. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d
Cir. 1985); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
63. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
64. Id. at 1044.
65. Id. at 1044. In so holding, the court relied upon legislative history showing that the
Senate and House compromise version of CERCLA deleted causation requirements present
in earlier versions. Id. at 1044-45; accord Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1292 (D.R.I.
1986).
66. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 549 (W.D.N.Y.
1988).
67. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 1223, 1224-25 (D. Mass.
1988); Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1282 (D. Del. 1987),
afl'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 674 (D. Idaho
1986). Section 9607(a)(4) provides that responsible parties are liable when "there is a re-
lease, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance."
68. With minor exceptions, a release means "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the
environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). Under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 1986 (SARA), Congress expanded the definition of "release" to specifically in-
clude "the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles
containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant." Id. § 9601 (22) (Supp. IV
1986).
69. E.g., New York v. Shore Realty Co., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985) (inexperience
in handling hazardous waste amounts to threatened release); United States v. Northernaire
Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 747 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (presence of hazardous substances
combined with unwillingness of any party to assert control over them amounted to a threat
of release); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 20,993 (E.D.
Pa, Sept. 4, 1985) (release threatened because of deteriorating condition of drums contain-
[Vol. 23:403
1989] TOXIC PROPERTY UNDER CERCLA 413
willing to apply a weak causation nexus between the release and the re-
sponse costs.
70
In a case of first impression, the court in Artesian Water Co. v. New
Castle County71 rejected a "but for" rule of causation and applied a "sub-
stantial factor" rule where there were two potential sources of release.7 2
Artesian, a water utility, sought to recover response costs from New Cas-
tle County, claiming that a release from the county's landfill had contam-
inated its water supply and necessitated finding temporary and perma-
nent alternative supplies." Studies showed that part of the
contamination might have been from another landfill, but technological
limitations made it impossible to "fingerprint" the contamination as ema-
nating from either site.7 4 The court rejected the "but for" rule because it
would have allowed both parties to avoid liability; and found New Castle
liable because its release was a "material element" and a "substantial fac-
tor" in bringing about Artesian's incurrence of response costs. 75
C. Allowance of Broad Recovery Costs
Liability under CERCLA covers a broad array of costs. 76 Responsible
ing hazardous wastes); United States v. Metate Asbestos Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1143, 1149 (D.
Ariz. 1984) (release occurred when wind blew asbestos fibers from the ground).
70. Ordinarily, in an action against a current owner there is little difficulty in establish-
ing that response costs were necessitated by a release from his facility because a governmen-
tal agency will have already made that determination. E.g., Wickland Oil Terminals v.
Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 1986) (state agency advised current owner that slag
left by a former owner constituted a potentially serious hazard); Artesian Water Co. v. New
Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 (D. Del. 1987) (state agency informed water utility
company that groundwater pollution had been discovered near its source of water supply
and that county landfill was mostly likely source of pollution). The problem of causation
arises more frequently in determining the liability of generators and transporters of hazard-
ous waste, a topic which is outside the scope of this Note.
71. 659 F. Supp. 1269 (D. Del. 1987), afl'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988).
72. Id. at 1283. A "but for" rule would require showing that costs would not have been
incurred "but for" a release from a particular site. The "substantial factor" rule applies
when "two or more causes have concurred to bring about an event, and any one of them,
operating alone, would have been sufficient to cause the identical result." Id.
73. Id. at 1274-75.
74. Id. at 1276.
75. Id. at 1282-84. By analogy the court adopted the rule applied in United States v.
Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983), where the court held that it was not necessary to
"fingerprint" waste as being from a particular generator if wastes found at the site are of the
same kind the generator produced. See Artesion, 659 F. Supp. at 1282 (citing Wade, 577 F.
Supp. at 1332-33).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(C). As originally enacted, section 9607(a) provided that
responsible parties were liable for:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Govern-
ment or a State not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent
with the national contingency plan; and
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parties are liable for all removal" or remedial 8 costs incurred by govern-
mental agencies and for necessary response79 costs incurred by any other
person. 0 The removal or remedial actions, however, must be conducted
within National Contingency Plan ("NCP") guidelines."1 A private party
may. be reimbursed from the Superfund only if it obtains preapproval
from the EPA. Preapproval is limited to cleanup of sites on the national
priority list.82 However, demonstrating consistency with NCP guidelines
by obtaining preapproval is not a prerequisite to recovery of response
costs from another responsible party." Liability does not extend to com-
pensation for economic losses or personal injury.84
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the
reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a
release.
The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 added provisions including
liability for costs of health assessment studies and specifically providing that amounts re-
coverable include interest. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
77. Removal actions are defined in section 9601(23) and are those actions which are in-
tended only as a short-term abatement of the hazard. Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle
County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (D. Del. 1987), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988).
78. Remedial actions are defined at section 9601(24) and are generally those actions
which permanently restore long-term environmental quality. Id. at 1278.
79. Response costs include both removal and remedial costs. § 9601(25). Response costs
are "necessary" if they are required by a governmental agency on the federal, state or local
level. NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986).
80. In Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1141-43 (E.D. Pa. 1982), the
court held that the term "any other person" did not preclude one responsible party, the
current owner, from seeking recovery from other responsible parties, particularly where the
current owner had not voluntarily contributed to the hazard.
81. Section 9605 requires preparation of a National Contingency Plan ("NCP") setting
forth a comprehensive scheme for addressing the problem of hazardous waste removal. Part
of the NCP directs the establishment of a national priorities list identifying priority cleanup
sites. Id. § 9605(8)-(9). The current NCP is found at 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 (1986).
82. Ohio v. United States EPA, 838 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Section 9611(a)(2) specif-
ically provides that use of Superfund monies to pay claims by nongovernmental parties
must be approved under the plan and certified by the responsible official.
83. In early cases, courts were split on whether consistency with the NCP required prior
governmental approval for recovery of private response costs. Compare, e.g., Bulk Distribu-
tion Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1445-48 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (A claimant
must obtain governmental approval of its cleanup plan and incur costs before commencing
an action to recover costs from other responsible parties.) with Pinole Point Properties v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 289-90 (N.D. Ca. 1984) (Consistency with the
NCP does not require preauthorization or supervision.). However, the final revisions of the
NCP made it clear that prior governmental approval is not a prerequisite to private party
recovery. Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1575 (5th
Cir. 1988); Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 1986); Arte-
sian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 n.4 (D. Del. 1987), aff'd, 851
F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting 50 Fed. Reg. 47934 (Nov. 20, 1985)).
84. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 360 (1986); Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle
County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1285-86 (D. Del. 1987), af'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988). Al-
though medical expenses for treatment of personal injuries and disease are not recoverable,
"cost of medical testing and screening . . . to assess the effect of the release or discharge on
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Responsible parties are also liable for damages to natural resources, but
only in actions brought by the federal government or a state, and only
where both the release and the resulting damages occurred wholly after
CERCLA's enactment. s5 In contrast to the prospective nature of liability
for damages to natural resources, liability for response costs is retroactive,
and thus is imposed without regard to the fact that the conduct creating
the hazard occurred prior to the passage of CERCLA. Constitutional
challenges to CERCLA's retroactive application have been unsuccessful."'
As a practical matter, application of a strict liability standard in con-
junction with a weak causation requirement and broad recovery means
that an innocent current owner is liable for enormous cleanup costs sim-
ply because of his status as owner even if his conduct was not wrongful
and even though there is no certainty his property caused the harm. 7
Proponents of such extensive liability argue that the innocent owner ex-
pands the harm by failing to abate the hazard. 8 However, such liability
can be greatly disproportionate to the innocent owner's contribution to
the harm and unrelated to any economic benefit he derived from hazard-
ous waste activities. Yet, the courts have reasoned that liability without
fault is consistent with CERCLA's goal of spreading costs among as many
parties as possible and is more equitable than imposing the full costs of
cleanup on the public.8 '
D. Limitations on Defenses
Strict liability under CERCLA is not absolute. An otherwise responsi-
ble party may assert three affirmative defenses to escape liability. These
defenses require a showing that the hazardous condition and resulting
damages were "caused solely" by an act of God,90 an act of war, or an
public health or to identify potential public health problems presented by the release" may
be recoverable. Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f); see Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 674-75 (D. Idaho
1986).
86. E.g., United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984,
995-98 (D.S.C. 1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part, sub nom. United States v. Monsanto
Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp.
162, 217-21 (W.D. Mo. 1985). For a discussion of the constitutional challenge to CERCLA's
retroactive application see Freeman, Inappropriate and Unconstitutional Retroactive Ap-
plication of Superfund Liability, 42 Bus. Law. 215 (1986).
87. Note, supra note 10, at 262.
88. Note, supra note 10, at 265; see also United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670
F. Supp. 742, 748 (W.D. Mich. 1987) ("Congress clearly intended that the landowner be
considered to have 'caused' part of the harm.").
89. Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,133, 20,134
(E.D. Pa. July 28, 1987); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1114 (D.N.J. 1983);
Note, supra note 10, at 262.
90. An "act of God" is narrowly defined as "an unanticipated grave natural disaster or
other natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character, the ef-
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unrelated third party.91 In order to prevail as an innocent landowner
under the third party defense, the current owner must show that: (1) the
sole cause of the damage was the act or omission of a third party; (2) the
third party was not an employee or agent or directly or indirectly in a
contractual relationship with the current owner; and (3) he exercised due
care and took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of the
third party.9 2 The showing of due care must be established by a prepon-
derance of the evidence."
Few current owners to date have successfully avoided liability under
the third-party defense. New York v. Shore Realty Corp.94 was one of the
fects of which could not have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or
foresight." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1).
The act of God defense has been asserted in only two cases, without success in either. In
Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1986), toxic chemicals spread to a sur-
rounding neighborhood during efforts to extinguish a fire which started when a bolt of light-
ning struck a warehouse. Id. at 312. The defense was asserted when the owner was ordered
to expend monies over and above the several hundred thousand dollars already spent. Id. at
313. Acknowledging that successful assertion of the defense would remove Wagner from the
classification of a responsible party and entitle him to indemnification from a third party,
the court went on to state that in an act of God defense "there is no third party .. and
reimbursement from the EPA is doubtful." Id. at 316-17.
In United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053 (C.D. Cal. 1987), the owner/operator
of a toxic waste facility raised the act of God defense, asserting that heavy rainfalls were
natural disasters constituting acts of God. Id. at 1061. The court rejected the defense, find-
ing that the "rains were not the kind of 'exceptional' natural phenomena to which the nar-
row act of God defense" applies because they were "foreseeable based on normal climatic
conditions and any harm caused by the rain could have been prevented through design of
proper drainage channels." Id.
91. Section 9607(b) provides:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person other-
wise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or
threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were
caused solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the
defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual
relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant (except where the sole
contractual arrangement arises from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage by
a common carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance con-
cerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in
light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against fore-
seeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
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first cases in which the responsible party asserted the third-party defense.
Shore claimed it was entitled to the third-party defense because the haz-
ardous conditions were created by a prior tenant and Shore had exercised
due care while it was in control of the property. 5 The court held that the
harm to Shore was not "caused solely" by a third party because Shore
knew of the prior tenant's activities before purchasing the property,
should have foreseen that such activities would continue, and did not
take "precautions against" the tenant continuing the activities.9
Other courts have found an insufficient showing of sole causation and
failure to exercise due .care where an owner did nothing more than seek a
preliminary injunction to prevent a sublessee from running a "sloppy op-
eration, 9 7 and where an absentee owner negligently or willfully failed to
inspect property leased to a chemical manufacturing company.98
Most current owners attempting to use the third-party defense have
been unable to overcome the relationship hurdle, which requires that the
third-party not be in a contractual or employee relationship with the cur-
rent owner. 9 For example, in Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co.,100
two employees accepted bribes and allowed unauthorized disposal of haz-
ardous wastes at the city's landfill.""1 The city claimed it was entitled to
the third-party defense because the employees were acting outside the
scope of their employment, a defense available to employers under com-
95. Id. at 1048.
96. Id. at 1049. Shore knew before purchasing the property that a tenant was operating a
hazardous waste storage facility, had conducted an environmental study which showed the
site to be a "potential time bomb," but purchased the property although the state denied
Shore a waiver of liability. Id. at 1038-39. After Shore acquired title to the property, the
holdover tenant continued to add hazardous chemicals to the site while Shore did nothing to
stop the continuing pollution except seek an eviction. Id. at 1039. The court noted,that
Shore might also have been barred from using the defense because the purchase agreement
provided that Shore assume some environmental liability from the prior owner. Id. at 1048
n.23,
97. Washington v. Time Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529, 532-33 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
98. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 169 (4th Cir. 1988).
99. It would seem obvious that there is a contractual relationship between a current
owner and his predecessor in title. However, one court did not preclude the current owner's
use of the third-party defense on the basis of a contractual relationship with the predecessor
in title when a mortgagee foreclosed on the prior owner's property, bid on the property at
the sheriff's sale and assigned the bid to the current owner, who then took title. United
States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985). The
court stated that the relationship "obstacle which has previously precluded use of this de-
fense is not present in this case." Id. at 20,994. Because the question was before the court on
the current owner's motion for summary judgment and the government apparently con-
ceded that there was no contractual relationship, the statement must be viewed as dicta.
When the relationship is one of lessor and lessee, the third-party defense also fails. E.g.,
United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 748 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
100. 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,133 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 1987).
101. One of the employees was a security guard hired to protect against unauthorized
dumping. Id. at 20,133.
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mon-law principles of vicarious liability.' 0 ' The court rejected the argu-
ment, relying on legislative history that indicated the defense was in-
tended to be more akin to the third-party defense under common law
principles of strict and vicarious liability for ultrahazardous activities and
was available under CERCLA only where the responsible party had no
connection to the third party. 0 3 Although the court acknowledged the
harshness of its holding, it nonetheless found that the city and its em-
ployees were connected and that the connection was not broken by a
"scope of employment" limitation. 04 To adopt such a limitation, the
court reasoned, would "undermine CERCLA'S goal of prompt clean-up of
hazardous substances at the expense of parties designated by Congress"
and "create an opportunity for covered persons to defeat its purposes."' 0 5
The court was essentially unwilling to provide such an opportunity for
parties to escape liability.
E. Application of Joint and Several Liability
Early versions of the CERCLA legislation expressly provided for joint
and several liability among responsible parties, but the provision was de-
leted before final passage. 06 Most courts found that this deletion from
the final version meant only that CERCLA does not mandate imposition
of joint and several liability but permits application of common law tort
principles, including joint and several liability. 07 Accordingly, courts im-
pose joint and several liability in "appropriate circumstances." The courts
differ, however, in determining when circumstances are appropriate.'
The seminal case on the issue of joint and several liability under CER-
CLA is United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.,0 9 in which the government
sought cleanup costs from twenty-four generators and transporters of
hazardous wastes. The court adopted the approach of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which finds joint and several liability appropriate
102. Id. at 20,134.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 20,134-35.
105. Id. at 20,135.
106. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805-08 (S.D. Ohio 1983);
Note, supra note 10, at 263 n.81.
107. Developments, supra note 4, at 1524-25. At common law, when there is more than
one defendant, liability may be joint and several or apportioned. Dubuc & Evans, supra
note 8, at 10,197-98. Imposition of joint and several liability makes each defendant totally
responsible for the full amount of damages, while apportionment requires a defendant to
pay only its share. Id.
108. Because there is basic agreement that development of a federal common-law ap-
proach to joint and several liability is more appropriate than application of varying state
laws, the disagreement focuses on what the federal common law should be. Developments,
supra note 4, at 1526-27.
109. 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
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when two or more persons acting independently cause harm which is indi-
visible and incapable of being reasonably apportioned. 110 The burden of
showing divisible harm and reasonable apportionment of liability is on
the parties who would otherwise be jointly and severably liable."'
The Restatement's indivisible harm rule is subject to criticism because
under CERCLA, application of the rule inevitably results in joint and
several liability and forces parties who did not benefit from the activity
and did not contribute to the harm to pay disproportionately high recov-
ery costs.1 1 2 This occurs because wastes have differing degrees of toxicity
and migratory potential and, once commingled, may produce a synergistic
effect different from the effect each would have caused separately.'13 Ar-
guably, the innocent current owner could avoid joint and several liability
by showing his lack of contribution to the harm; however, under CER-
CLA he is deemed to have contributed to the harm by failing to abate the
hazard.114
In United States v. A & F Materials Co.,1 5 the court declined to follow
Chem-Dyne and fashioned what it considered to be a more moderate ap-
proach to joint and several liability based upon an amendment proposed
by Congressman Gore prior to CERCLA's enactment.11 6 The Gore
Amendment was designed to soften the impact of joint and several liabil-
ity by permitting apportionment where a defendant who contributed only
a small amount to the harm could not prove the degree of his contribu-
tion. 17 The approach allows a court to apportion liability on a variety of
factors, including relative contribution to hazardous waste in terms of
amount and toxicity, the degree of involvement of the parties, the degree
of care exercised, and cooperation with the government in prevention of
harm.'
110. Id. at 810.
111. Id. at 811.
112. Developments, supra note 4, at 1529-31.
113. Id. at 1528-29; United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F.
Supp. 984, 994-95 (D.S.C. 1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part, sub nom. United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988); see United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp.
1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
114. Note, supra note 10, at 265.
115. 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984).
116. Id. at 1255-56.
117. Id. at 1256.
118. In full, the Gore amendment would permit courts to apportion liability according to
the following criteria when a responsible party could not prove his contribution to the harm:
(i) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a discharge
release or disposal of a hazardous waste can be distinguished;
(ii) the amount of the hazardous waste involved;
(iii) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved;
(iv) the degree of involvement by the parties in the generation, transportation, treat-
ment, storage, or disposal of the hazardous waste;
(v) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to the hazardous waste
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The approach of the Gore amendment is viewed as being more equita-
ble than the Chem-Dyne approach. It reduces the potential for unfair
targeting of defendants on the basis of ease of identification and wealth.
It promotes fairness, particularly when the party's contribution to the
harm was minor, by imposing liability proportionate to culpability.119
However, the government must absorb the costs of orphan shares, where
there are absent or judgment-proof responsible parties. The government
must also bear the costs of locating and impleading all responsible par-
ties.120 Such results are inconsistent with CERCLA's intent to defray as
many costs as possible from taxpayers and provide efficient allocation of
Superfund monies.
Imposition of joint and several liability, especially under the indivisible
harm rule, leads to harsh results for the innocent current owner. The cur-
rent owner is frequently the easiest target for recovery because he is read-
ily identifiable and other responsible parties may be absent or insol-
vent.12' Once identified, the current owner can be compelled to undertake
total cleanup with no assistance from the government in identifying, lo-
cating or impleading other potentially responsible parties.' 2 2 However,
proponents of CERCLA and courts facing the issue have found that joint
and several liability consistent with CERCLA's goal of ensuring full gov-
ernment recovery of cleanup costs. Further, courts have held that Con-
gress specifically sought to provide a means of recovery where responsible
parties cannot be located or are insolvent.1 3 Because most releases of
hazardous substances cause a single, indivisible harm, recovery would be
impossible if it was contingent upon showing the degree of each responsi-
ble party's contribution." 4 Proponents of the imposition of joint and sev-
eral liability also argue that imposing joint and several liability promotes
prompter environmental cleanup because joint and several liability re-
leases the government from the burden of locating and impleading other
responsible parties.1 5
F. The Right to Contribution
Connected to the question of joint and several liability is the question
of contribution. Although CERCLA as originally enacted did not contain
concerned, taking into account the characteristics of such hazardous waste; and
(vi) the degree of cooperation by the parties with Federal, State, or local officials to
prevent any harm to the public health or the environment.
Id. (citing 126 CONG. REc. 26,781 (1980)).
119. Developments, note 4, at 1533-34.
120. Id. at 1534.
121. Id. at 1529-30.
122. E.g., United States v. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448, 450 (D. Md. 1986).
123. Note, supra note 10, at 263 n.81.
124. Id. at 263, 265.
125. Developments, supra note 4, at 1525.
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an express right to contribution from other responsible parties, courts
generally held that such a right exists when joint and several liability has
been imposed. 128 Once two or more parties are found jointly and severally
liable, contribution allows the court to apportion liability among the par-
ties in accordance with fair and equitable considerations. 2 7 To find that
CERCLA does not permit a right to contribution would unjustly require a
single party to bear the entire cost of cleanup while allowing other re-
sponsible parties to avoid liability altogether.
1 2
1
A right to contribution mitigates the harshness of joint and several lia-
bility by giving the innocent current owner the right to implead and re-
cover costs from other responsible parties.'2 9 Additionally, a current
owner who knows he can seek contribution from other parties is more
likely to voluntarily initiate prompt cleanup. Moreover, contribution fur-
thers CERCLA's goal of spreading the costs of cleanup."10
IV. EFFECT OF SARA ON INNOCENT OWNER LIABILITY
Despite the criticism leveled at the broad and liberal construction
courts gave CERCLA,"' the Superfund Amendments and Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 1986"2 ("SARA") passed by a wide margin and did little to
change CERCLA's broad liability provisions."' In fact, post SARA deci-
sions assert that SARA supports imposition of strict liability on current
owners because it promotes cleanup of hazardous waste by increasing the
pool of responsible parties and reducing the costs to the public." 4
126. Although a number of courts had stated in dicta that a right to contribution existed
under CERCLA, Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Colo. 1985), was the first
case to actually hold that the development of federal common law principles of contribution
was not precluded by CERCLA's failure to provide for such a right and that the right to
contribution was consistent with the overall legislative scheme. See also United States v.
Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 224-30 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (arriving at same con-
clusion without benefit of the ASARCO decision). For a comprehensive discussion of the
private right of contribution among potentially responsible parties, see United States v. New
Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1262-69 (D. Del. 1986).
127. United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 224-25 (W.D. Mo.
1985). Liability may be apportioned on a pro rata basis or according to comparative fault.
Id. at 225.
128. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 669 F. Supp.
1285, 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
129. Garber, Federal Common Law of Contribution Under the 1986 CERCLA Amend-
ments, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 365, 370 (1987); Developments, supra note 4, at 1535.
130. Chemical Waste Management, 669 F. Supp. at 1290-91.
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1982).
132. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (Supp. IV 1986).
133. Dubuc & Evans, supra note 8, at 10197.
134. Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,133, 20,134
(E.D. Pa. July 28, 1987); United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1264 (D.
Del. 1986).
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SARA's specific inclusion of a right to contribution and its stamp of
approval on de minimis settlements and mixed funding of cleanups will
alleviate some of CERCLA's harshness. However, SARA's reenforcement
of joint and several liability and the narrowing of the innocent landowner
defense continue to leave the innocent current owner vulnerable to bear-
ing more than his fair share of the cost of cleanup when his involvement
in creating the hazardous condition and the benefit he derived from haz-
ardous waste activities is compared to that of other potentially responsi-
ble parties.
A. Narrowing the Third-Party "Innocent Landowner" Defense
Under CERCLA an innocent current owner could defend against liabil-
ity by showing that a third party, with whom he did not stand in a direct
or indirect contractual relationship, was solely responsible for the dam-
ages and that he had exercised due care and took precautions against the
third party's foreseeable conduct.13 Although "contractual relationship"
was not defined in CERCLA, courtsgenerally find that the innocent cur-
rent owner cannot avoid liability on the grounds that the harm was
caused solely by a third party who was a predecessor in title or a lessee. 136
SARA affirms these court decisions by defining "contractual relation-
ship" as including "land contracts, deeds, or other instruments transfer-
ring title or possession" of real property.1 37 However, if the property is
acquired after the disposal of hazardous substances, and the current
owner does not know and has no reason to know the property is contami-
nated, he is entitled to the third-party defense notwithstanding his con-
tractual relationship with the third party, if he can also meet the due care
and precautionary requirements of CERCLA. 35 In order to establish that
135. Supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
138. Section 9601(35)(A) provides:
The term "contractual relationship," for the purpose of section [9607(b)(3)], in-
cludes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds or other instruments transferring
title or possession, unless the real property on which the facility concerned is located
was acquired by the defendant after the disposal or placement of the hazardous sub-
stance on, in, or at the facility, and one or more of the circumstances described in
clause (i), (ii), or (iii) is also established by the defendant by a preponderance of the
evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not know and
had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the re-
lease or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility.
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facility by escheat, or
through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through the exercise of emi-
nent domain authority by purchase or condemnation.
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest.
In addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must establish that he has satis-
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he had no reason to know of the contamination, the current owner must
have undertaken appropriate inquiry at the time of purchase into com-
monly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the previous
ownership and uses of the property.139 Other factors taken into account
include any specialized knowledge or experience of the owner, the rela-
tionship of purchase price to value, the obviousness or likelihood of con-
tamination, and the ability to discover the contamination by inspec-
tion.'40 The owner is not entitled to the defense if he causes or
contributes in any way to the release.' 4 ' Further, if he learns of a release
or threatened release while he owns the property and subsequently trans-
fers ownership without disclosing that knowledge, he is treated as a re-
sponsible party and is barred from using the third-party defense.' 4'
SARA only appears to soften the harshness of CERCLA's imposition of
strict liability on innocent current owners. It does not create a separate
innocent landowner defense but merely clarifies that under certain cir-
cumstances the current owner is entitled to CERCLA's original third-
party defense despite his contractual relationship with a prior owner who
contributed to the hazardous condition.' 43 At best, SARA provides a pro-
spective purchaser with vague guidelines on the circumstances that are
sufficient to create statutory innocence, and those guidelines impose sub-
stantial affirmative obligations.'" While the new statute has not yet been
tested in the courts, it appears that only a thorough investigation of prior
ownership and uses of the property, coupled with a physical and environ-
mental inspection will rise to the level of statutory innocence Congress
fled the requirements of section [9607(b)(3)(a) and (b)].
Id.
139. Section 9601(35)(B) provides:
(B) To establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as provided in clause
(i) of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the defendant must have undertaken, at
the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses
of the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to
minimize liability. For purposes of the preceding sentence the court shall take into
account any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant, the
relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if uncontaminated,
commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the property, the ob-
viousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at the property, and the
ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection.
Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. § 9601(35)(D).
142. Id. § 9601(35)(C). The addition of this provision actually serves the interest of the
innocent current owner. Prior to its enactment, courts had held that a prior owner was a
responsible party only if he participated in hazardous waste disposal activities, without re-
gard to his knowledge of the contamination. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
143. Garber, supra note 129, at 378.
144. Marcotte, Toxic Blackacre: Unprecedented Liability for Landowners, A.B.A. J.,
Nov. 1, 1987, at 68.
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felt was fair.'45
Post-SARA purchasers may be able to lessen the risk of CERCLA lia-
bility by undertaking a thorough physical and historical investigation of
the property and by obtaining warranties from the seller. However, few
current owners who purchased contaminated property prior to the enact-
ment of SARA will have conducted the precautionary steps necessary to
establish statutory innocence because the steps required go beyond those
ordinarily taken by a prospective purchaser. Accordingly, for the pre-
SARA purchaser, the contractual relationship with a predecessor in title
who contaminated the property will continue to bar the use of the third-
party defense.
B. Reenforcement of Joint and Several Liability
SARA does not address the issue of joint and several liability, but its
legislative history reflects a congressional decision to adopt the standards
which were developing in the courts under CERCLA.4 6 The rule estab-
lished in United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp. 4 was endorsed by Congress
as an appropriate uniform federal rule for the imposition of joint and sev-
eral liability." " Under Chem-Dyne, joint and several liability is imposed
whenever the harm is indivisible and incapable of apportionment.-"
In cases decided after SARA, the majority of courts have adopted the
Chem-Dyne rule and have found the harm indivisible because the differ-
ent properties of the wastes involved and the synergistic effect that re-
sults from their commingling make it impossible to determine the extent
of each party's contribution to the harm. 50 Because the current owner is
145. Id. at 68-70. Reliance upon a physical inspection of the property is insufficient be-
cause evidence of past contamination may not be visible and because the contamination
may have resulted from the release of hazardous substances from another site. Id.; Climate
Gloomy, supra note 53, at 1106. To guard against contamination which is not obvious, costly
environmental audits and exhaustive research into the history of the property's use are rec-
ommended. Marcotte, supra note 144, at 69-70.
146. H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 74, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2856.
147. 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
148. H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 74, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2856.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 111-13.
150. E.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 172-73 n.25-27 (4th Cir. 1988)
(rejecting apportionment of liability between generators on the basis of volume of waste
deposited where there was no showing of a relationship between the volume, release and
harm and no evidence of the individual and interactive qualities of the substances); O'Neil
v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 724-25 (D.R.I. 1988) (rejecting apportionment of liability on the
basis of phase of cleanup during which generator's wastes was discovered and on basis of
number of drums of wastes where wastes were not identical and where some drums had
ruptured while others were still intact); United States v. Tyson, No. 84-2663, slip op. at 6-8
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 1988) (1988 WESTLAW 7163) (finding harm indivisible between owners,
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strictly liable if he is not entitled to one of the enumerated defenses, he is
considered to have caused part of the harm and, under the Chem-Dyne
approach, the extent of his contribution to the harm is deemed to be indi-
visible from the harm caused by other responsible parties. 15
In short, although SARA does not mandate imposition of joint and sev-
eral liability, neither does it provide any means for separating a
nonculpable current owners's contribution to the harm and excluding him
from the imposition of joint and several liability. Most courts view the
issue of the innocent current owner's comparative lack of fault as being
more appropriately considered in suits for contribution after the govern-
ment has been provided with funds to facilitate prompt cleanup.1 52
In Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 53 the court ob-
served that the issue of joint and several liability arises most frequently
in actions involving the scope of a responsible party's liability to the gov-
ernment.154 The Allied court did not specifically disapprove of the Chem-
Dyne approach to joint and several liability in a suit brought by the gov-
ernment against responsible parties. 155 However, the court adopted the
moderate approach based upon the factors in the Gore Amendment'5 "
where the cause of action involves a claim by one potentially responsible
party against other potentially responsible parties.157 In making the dis-
tinction, the court noted that claims between potentially responsible par-
ties are not always in the nature of contribution and that "[a] blanket
prohibition against joint and several liability in claims between responsi-
ble parties would discourage a willing PRP from cleaning up on its own
...especially. . . where one or more of the parties are insolvent and,
thus, incapable of sharing the costs of cleanup.1 58
As courts continue to develop the rules of joint and several liability
under CERCLA, the flexible approach of Allied should be retained and
expanded as circumstances and equitable considerations dictate. CER-
operators and generators because of mixing and commingling of different wastes). But cf.
United States v. Miami Drum Servs., Inc., 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1469, 1475 n.6 (S.D.
Fla. 1986) (suggesting that divisibility of harm could be shown where there are reliable
records "indicating who disposed of the hazardous waste or in what quantities") (quoting
126 CONG. RE C. H11,788 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980)).
151. United States v. Northemaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742,748 (W.D. Mich. 1987);
see Tyson, at 6-8 (1988 WESTLAW 7163).
152. E.g., Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563 (E.D. Pa. 1988);
O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 725-26 (D.R.I. 1988); United States v. Stringfellow, 661
F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
153. 691 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. M. 1988).
154. Id. at 1117.
155. Id. at 1118 n.12.
156. See supra note 118 for the factors considered in apportioning liability under the
Gore Amendment.
157, Allied, 691 F. Supp. at 1115-18.
158. Id. at 1118.
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CLA does not mandate a rigid application of the Chem-Dyne rule in
every instance, especially "where the peculiar facts of the case point to a
more fair apportionment of liability."1 9 A more flexible approach based
upon the factors in the Gore Amendment and traditional concepts of
comparative fault is particularly appropriate where one of the parties is
an innocent current owner who did not participate in hazardous waste
activities, exercised care when he learned of the hazardous condition of
his property, and cooperated in minimizing the harm, even if his conduct
prior to acquiring the property did not meet the demanding requirements
of the innocent land owner defense.
C. Specific Inclusion of Right to Contribution
SARA specifically provides for the right to contribution from other po-
tentially responsible parties.160 The right to contribution is to be gov-
erned by federal law and allows the courts to "allocate response costs
among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines
are appropriate."' 61 By explicitly providing for a right to contribution in
cases of joint and several liability, Congress sought to encourage private
party settlements and cleanups by bringing all responsible parties to-
gether in one action and lessening the ill will that results when one re-
sponsible party is targeted for the full costs of response actions.112
Congress, however, did not elucidate on what the federal law of contri-
bution should be nor expand on what equitable factors courts should con-
sider in allocating recoverable costs. A right to contribution, however,
does not absolve the innocent current owner of liability because the right
exists only after joint and several liability has been imposed and upon a
showing that the innocent current owner has discharged more than his
fair share of the common liability.'" Therefore, the right to contribution
must be distinguished from the court's decision to apportion damages
among responsible parties rather than impose joint and several liability in
the first instance.6 4 From the perspective of the innocent current owner,
159. Id. at 1116.
160. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, § 9613(f) (Supp. IV 1986).
161. Id.
162. H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 79, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2861-62.
163. E.g., United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 686 F. Supp. 696, 700 (S.D. Ind.
1988); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Note, supra
note 10, at 269.
164. As the court in Stringfellow explained:
There are two distinct contexts in which the issue of "apportionment" arises ....
In the first context, the question is whether the harm resulting from two or more
causes is indivisible, or whether the harm is capable of division or apportionment
among separate causes ....
The second context in which the issue of "apportionment" arises occurs after the
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the distinction is significant because suits for contribution do not typi-
cally provide for joint liability.'65 The result is that once the innocent
current owner is found jointly and severally liable with another responsi-
ble party, they alone are responsible for the liability of absent parties
while impleaded parties are responsible only for their individual share of
the damages. 66 By contrast, if the current owner's contribution to the
harm was found divisible so that joint and several liability was not im-
posed in the first instance, he would not be responsible for the liability of
parties who were absent because they were unknown, could not be lo-
cated, or were judgment-proof. 67
Alteration of the common law rules by providing that joint and several
liability can be imposed against other responsible parties in suits for con-
tribution would alleviate the inequity that results when the innocent cur-
rent owner must rely solely upon his right of contribution to force others
to pay for the harm they have created. 6 s Since joint and several liability
can be imposed when one potentially responsible party seeks recovery
from other potentially responsible parties in an action under section
9607,169 a responsible party who seeks contribution under section 9613(f)
should not be denied the same protection simply because the government
initiated the action.
To date, courts faced with suits for contribution have not addressed the
question of joint and several liability but have focused on the equitable
factors to be applied in developing a federal approach to apportioning
damages that will be consistent with CERCLA's policies. While no uni-
form rule has yet emerged, the trend appears to be in the direction of
adopting the factors of the Gore Amendment,'1 0 along with more tradi-
tional equitable considerations, 17 1 in apportioning damages. The stan-
first inquiry regarding the indivisibility of the harm. If the defendants are found to be
jointly and severally liable, any defendant may seek to limit the amount of damages
it would ultimately have to pay by seeking an order of contribution apportioning the
damages among the defendants.
Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. at 1060.
165. United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 229 (W.D. Mo. 1985);
Developments, supra note 4, at 1532.
166. Developments, supra note 4, at 1532.
167. Id. at 1525.
168. See id. at 1535-39.
169. Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1100, 1118 (N.D. Ill.
1988).
170. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Dingwell, 690 F. Supp. 78 (D. Me. 1988); United States v.
Tyson, No. 84-2663 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 1988) (1988 WESTLAW 7163); see Chemical Waste
Management v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1292 n.10 (E.D. Pa. 1987);
United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
Other methods of contribution are pro rata contribution, comparative fault and compara-
tive causation. For a discussion of how these methods fail to accomplish CERCLA's goals,
see Garber, supra note 129, at 382-85.
171. E.g., Smith Land & Improvements Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir.
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dards of the Gore Amendment have not been applied in contribution ac-
tions involving an innocent current owner and are more precisely tailored
for apportioning damages between parties actively engaged in hazardous
waste activities. However, courts should be able to adapt the Gore criteria
to the innocent current owner's contribution to the harm by comparing
his degree of involvement in the activity to that of other responsible par-
ties, his care with respect to the hazardous condition once it becomes
known to him, and his cooperation with the government in minimizing
the harm.
D. Provision for De Minimis Settlements and Mixed Funding
SARA172 specifically authorizes prompt settlement with a potentially
responsible party under two sets of circumstances if the settlement in-
volves only a minor portion of the response costs. 7 3 First, a de minimis
settlement is authorized where the amount of the party's contribution to
the hazardous substances or the toxicity of the substances contributed
were minimal in comparison to other substances at the facility.174 Sec-
ondly, if the potentially responsible party is the property owner, a de
minimis settlement is authorized if the owner did not conduct or permit
hazardous waste activities, did not contribute to the release or threatened
release, and did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the contam-
ination when he purchased the property. 7 5
1988) (the doctrine of caveat emptor, reduced purchase price and cost of response are prop-
erly considered in the allocation of costs), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 837 (1989); United States
v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (comparative fault, contributory
negligence and due care are appropriate considerations in apportioning damages); Chemical
Waste Management, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1292 (E.D. Pa.
1987) ("innocence" and "fault" are relevant to issue of damages).
172. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (Supp. IV 1986).
173. Id. § 9622(g).
174. Section 9622(g)(1)(A) states:
(A) Both of the following are minimal in comparison to other hazardous substances at
the facility:
(i) The amount of the hazardous substances contributed by that party to the
facility.
(ii) The toxic or other hazardous effects of the substances contributed by that party
to the facility.
Id. § 9622(g)(1)(A).
175. Section 9622(g)(1)(B) states:
(B) The potentially responsible party-
(i) is the owner of real property on or in which the facility is located;
(ii) did not conduct or permit the generation, transportation, storage, treatment, or
disposal of any hazardous substance at the facility; and
(iii) did not contribute to the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance
at the facility through any action or omission.
This subparagraph (B) does not apply if the potentially responsible party
purchased the real property with actual or constructive knowledge that the
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In addition to authorizing de minimis settlements, SARA provides for
mixed funding, which allows the use of Superfund monies to pay for the
liability of responsible parties who are unknown, cannot be found or are
otherwise unavailable or unwilling to settle. 6 In providing for de minimis
and mixed settlements, Congress sought to encourage responsible parties
to voluntarily initiate prompt cleanup. 1'7
Although the provision for mixed funding may alleviate the problems
created when the imposition of joint and several liability places the bur-
den of paying for orphan shares on the original defendants, the authoriza-
tion of de minimis settlements will not lessen the harshness of strict lia-
bility for innocent current owners. Few innocent current owners will be
able to show they had no constructive knowledge that the property had
been used for hazardous waste activities, because they will be unable to
meet the burden of proving that they took sufficient precautionary steps
of inquiry and investigation.
V. CONCLUSION
In developing legislation to combat environmental contamination from
hazardous waste, Congress devised a broad scheme of liability in the hope
that it would ensure prompt cleanup and spread the cost to those parties
who had benefited from hazardous waste activities. As the courts strictly
construed the legislation, there was alarm that innocent parties were un-
fairly caught in the web of strict liability, limited defenses, and joint and
several liability for harm they did not cause and from which they received
no benefit.
Congress, in responding to those concerns, has sought to create a more
equitable balance of cost sharing and encourage faster progress in tack-
ling the massive cleanup that still lies ahead. Although liability remains
strict and statutory "innocence" may be extremely difficult to attain, the
specific grant of a right of contribution and the endorsement of a policy
allowing de minimis and mixed funding settlements should encourage all
parties who face liability to initiate voluntary cleanup. Nonetheless, the
innocent current owner deserves additional protection against dispropor-
tionate liability.
Having recently addressed the plight of the innocent current owner in
SARA, it seems unlikely Congress will take any additional steps in the
near future because of the magnitude of the cleanup task that lies ahead.
property was used for the generation, transportation, storage, treatment, or
disposal of any hazardous substance.
Id. § 9622(g)(1)(B).
176. Id. § 9622(b).
177. H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 58-59, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2840-41.
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For the moment, then, courts face the responsibility of developing a
method of fair and equitable distribution of liability. Congress preserved
flexibility for the courts in fashioning a uniform federal law for the impo-
sition of joint and several liability and the apportionment of damages in
actions for contribution. By guarding against the rigid application of joint
and several liability against an innocent current owner and by careful
consideration in suits for contribution of equitable factors that further
CERCLA's goal of requiring those who benefited from hazardous waste
activity to pay for the harm they caused, courts will be able to evenly
balance congressional concerns for both prompt cleanup and fairness.
Diana L. McDavid
